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(for very high incomes) 
and from social welfare 
benefits (for poverty). 
Wages and salaries are 
market incomes – that is, 
before taxes, tax credits like 
Working for Families, and 
other government assistance. 
‘Market’ incomes include 
income from capital (real 
estate, investments, financial 
assets and other unearned 
income) as well as wages, 
but here we are looking 
only at wages and salaries 
(henceforth ‘wages’). Market 
income is distributed much 
more unequally than even 
New Zealand’s relatively 
high inequality of disposable 
incomes, let alone after also 
taking into account the 
provision of government 
services (or ‘final income’: 
see, for example, Aziz et al., 
2012). It is, therefore, 
Wages and salaries are a vital part of the picture of income 
inequality in New Zealand because so many people depend 
on them as their principal or only source of income, although 
it is important to remember that the greatest extremes of 
inequality most frequently come from investment income 
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Figure 1: Wages and salaries as a proportion of household income 
Source: Household Economic Survey, SNZ 
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important to consider inequality of 
disposable or final income, but there is a 
return to concern about the distribution 
of market incomes, sometimes referred to 
as ‘predistribution’, in part because high 
levels of market income inequality meet 
increasing political resistance to adequate 
redistribution through the tax and benefit 
system.
The importance of wage and salary income
The part played by wages and salaries 
in providing income to New Zealand’s 
households seems sometimes to be 
forgotten or taken for granted. Statistics 
New Zealand’s Household Economic 
Survey (HES) shows that wages make up 
around three-quarters of average regular 
and recurring household income: though 
it dipped during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
percentage has been rising since then, 
from 66% in 1998 to 72% in 2008 and 
75% in 2013.1 Wages were 85% of average 
market income in 2013. According to the 
HES, the majority of households receive 
incomes from no other source. 
Between 1983 and 2003, among 
families with at least one person aged 
25–59, Stillman et al. (2012) found 
that ‘labour income is by far the largest 
component of income and made up 
between 84% and 90% of regular income 
during the sample period’. According 
to Perry (2014, p.90), ‘The two factors 
that impact the most on the incomes 
of two-parent-with-dependent-children 
households are average wage rates and 
the total hours worked by the two 
parents.’ Easton (2013, p.3) reports that 
‘The majority of the poor are couples 
with jobs, with some – but not a lot of – 
children, living in their own home albeit 
with a mortgage.’ 
A Treasury study looking at incomes 
before and after taxes, transfers and public 
services found that the market incomes 
of the lowest income half of households 
had essentially remained static in real 
terms between 1988 and 2010, in spite 
of a marked increase in the number of 
earners per household (Aziz et al., 2012, 
figure 2). According to Perry (2014, p.15), 
‘Around two of every three two-parent 
families were dual-earner families from 
2007 to 2013, up from one in two in the 
early 1980s.’ Many families worked harder 
to stand still.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw 
clear lines between wages (and other 
market income) and household income 
inequality because of the effect of taxation, 
tax credits and the other forms of social 
assistance. But given the dominance of 
wages in household incomes, they must 
underpin any consideration of adequacy 
and fairness of household incomes – 
unless we are willing to move to much 
more universal income assistance. 
The distribution of wages
There is not as good publicly available 
data and analysis of the distribution of 
wages (or other market income) as there is 
for disposable household income. Easton 
(1983) provides some data for 1959–74; 
Dixon (1998) provided an analysis for 
the years 1984–97; and a 1999 Statistics 
New Zealand publication (Scott, 1999) 
provided further data for 1982–96. In 
somewhat more recent research, Stillman 
et al. (2012) analysed the incomes of 
families with at least one person aged 
25–59 from 1983 to 2003. They found 
that ‘real hourly wages declined 11–16% 
fairly evenly across the entire wage 
distribution between 1983 and 1993’. 
Between 1993 and 2003, real wages at and 
below the median grew only 3–6% while 
those above grew significantly faster: for 
example, 15% at the 9th decile. Changes 
in weekly earnings were less extreme, 
with no divergence from 1993 to 2003, 
because lower-paid workers worked more 
hours, confirming the observations above. 
However, there was a gradual increase 
in inequality in the top half of the wage 
distribution: the ratio between the 9th 
decile and the median increased by about 
6% between 1983 and 2003 for both 
hourly and weekly wages, and gross and 
disposable household income (indicating 
the close relationship between wage and 
household inequality). 
Since 2003 there have been some 
signs of an increase in wage inequality 
between lower and higher incomes. For 
example, as Figure 2 shows, the ratio 
of the median to the average hourly 
and weekly wage measured in the New 
Zealand Income Survey fell between 
1998 and 2014, indicating that middle-
income wage earners were receiving a 
declining proportion of the average wage 
and suggesting that higher wage and 
salary incomes were rising faster than 
low-wage incomes. Top salaries (such as 
those of chief executives and highly paid 
professionals) rose steeply during the 
1990s, in relation both to lower wages 
and to each other. There is conflicting 
evidence as to their trend during the 
2000s. 
Wage and salary taxable income data 
from Inland Revenue2 unfortunately 
only goes back to 1994, after the biggest 
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Figure 2: Ratio of median to average earnings 
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growth in disposable income inequality 
occurred. Pareto coefficients calculated 
on the top incomes show that top salaries 
rose more quickly than others in the late 
1990s, stretching the inequality between 
top executives and most workers. It 
possibly fell a little during the 2000s and 
more recently rose (though note that 2012 
data is provisional). On this data, the 
average income in the top 0.1% (one in a 
thousand) of salaries was approximately 
$650,000 in 2012, and $285,000 for the 
top 1%. The figures had been $265,000 
and $130,000 respectively in 1994. The 
average for the top 0.1% rose from 16.5 
times the average for the bottom 90% in 
1994 to 21 times in 2012, and for the top 
1% from eight times the bottom 90% in 
1994 to nine times in 2012. 
However, the data does not include 
some forms of income that senior private 
sector executives frequently get as a 
significant part of their pay package, such 
as shares or share options. It is therefore 
likely to understate the total remuneration 
for this group. 
Although the lack of share option 
information doesn’t necessarily mean 
top income inequality is either under- 
or overstated, the apparent slight easing 
in inequality during the 2000s is not 
consistent with many media reports 
and analyses of accelerating inequality 
between the incomes of top executives 
and their workers over this period. From 
1997 to 2002, however, it is reasonably 
consistent with research by Otago 
academic Helen Roberts (Roberts, 2005, 
p.21; see Figure 5, noting that it shows 
real rather than nominal incomes). This 
shows chief executive remuneration rising 
from 11 times the average income of all 
workers in 1997 to 13 times in 2002. More 
recently, Fairfax business journalist Tim 
Hunter (2013) compared chief executive 
incomes to those of the average for staff 
in the companies they head. He found, for 
example, that the ratio had increased from 
22 times in 2010 to 26 times in 2012, which 
is consistent with the upturn showing from 
2010 in top salary inequalities in Figures 3 
and 4. His methodology is different from 
either Roberts’ or the tax data analysis, so 
the research is not directly comparable, 
but it is consistent with strongly growing 
inequality between top incomes and those 
of the great majority of employees. These 
kinds of studies are largely limited to the 
chief executives of sharemarket-listed 
companies and top public sector managers 
because of lack of other data, but it seems 
unlikely that other executives would have 
had significantly different trends, given 
their close attention to relativities.   
At the other end of the income scale, 
a recent Treasury report estimated that 
in the year to March 2014 about 30% 
of households with dependants earned 
wages below the then living wage of 
$18.40 an hour. It estimated that 45% 
of wage earners earned less than $18.40, 
of whom 56% earned between the then 
minimum wage of $13.75 an hour and 
$15.00 an hour, and that included 60% 
of Mäori and Pasifika workers:
Over half of the sole parents with 
dependants who are working have 
wage rates below the Living Wage, 
and most of these earn less than 
$15 per hour. In 25% of households 
with two adults and dependants, the 
principal earner of the household 
is on a wage rate below the Living 
Wage. This earner may also have 
income from other sources, but 
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generally the partner and dependants 
will have an even lower wage rate if 
they are earning wages or a salary. 
(Galt and Palmer, 2013, pp.2, 7, 8
How much of New Zealand’s income goes to 
wage and salary earners?
However, individual or household income 
inequality is not the only concern as to 
how income is distributed. ‘Factor shares’ 
describe how the income of the economy is 
shared between the factors of production, 
labour and capital. Like inequality in 
general, this is a rising international 
concern because of the fall of the labour 
income share in most OECD countries. 
The International Labour Organization 
and economist Thomas Piketty are among 
those who have analysed it in depth.
In the national accounts, the income 
generated by the economy is divided into 
‘compensation of employees’ and ‘gross 
operating surplus’. Compensation of 
employees includes wages and non-wage 
benefits such as employer superannuation 
contributions, Accident Compensation 
Corporation employer levies and medical 
insurance paid by the employer. Gross 
operating surplus includes interest, 
dividends and self-employed income 
(called mixed income because it includes 
income from both labour and capital). 
The labour share is compensation of 
employees as a proportion of the total 
income generated by the economy (which 
is notionally equal to GDP). The ‘capital 
share’ is gross operating surplus as a 
proportion of total income, and the two 
shares add up to 100% by definition.3 
Sometimes the labour share is 
adjusted to include labour income of the 
self-employed, which has to be imputed 
because they do not necessarily pay 
themselves identifiable wages. There are 
various approaches to estimating the 
labour income of the self-employed, all 
of which have weaknesses.4 While our 
focus here is on wages, we do need to 
recognise moves by employers to pressure 
or force employees into nominally 
self-employed dependent contractor 
(‘outworking’) situations in order to 
shed their responsibility for employment 
standards. However, adding in imputed 
self-employed labour income does not 
appear to make a significant difference 
to the picture of a substantial fall in the 
labour share (this is discussed further 
below). Changes in the labour share 
are closely related to whether real wage 
rises keep up with labour productivity 
increases, also discussed below.
As Figure 6 shows, the labour share 
of income fell from approximately 60% 
of income in the early 1980s to 46% in 
2002 – a loss to wage earners of about 
a quarter of aggregate income. It then 
recovered to a little above 50%, but would 
need to be a sixth higher to return to its 
share in the early 1980s. In current dollar 
terms, that is a loss of about $19bn per 
year, or $10,000 per wage earner per year. 
The present value of the loss over that 
period is estimated at between $660bn (at 
a discount rate equivalent to investment 
in term deposits) and $1,200bn (at a 
discount rate equivalent to paying off a 
mortgage) or three to five times GDP. 
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Figure 6: How the nation's income is shared
Source: National Accounts, series SND031AA, SNZ 
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New Zealand’s labour share is relatively 
low by developed country standards. 
There are various sources of data for 
international comparisons: the United 
Nations, the OECD, Penn World Tables, 
and the European Commission’s AMECO 
(annual macro-economic) database, 
which includes most OECD countries, 
including New Zealand. All international 
comparisons are problematic, but AMECO 
appears to provide the most consistent 
comparisons. It includes estimates back 
to 1960, which must be regarded as even 
more problematic than recent dates 
because of lack of international System 
of National Accounts (SNA) standards, 
adopted in New Zealand from the year 
ended March 1972 (1971 in figures 7a 
and 7b). But the general picture appears 
to be that New Zealand’s labour share was 
broadly comparable to the OECD median 
until the 1980s and then fell well behind, 
before partially recovering from the early 
2000s. For the adjusted labour income 
share, data is available only since 1986 for 
New Zealand (1985 in Figure 7b).5   
The distribution across types of 
income also can be seen in Figure 8, 
which shows household disposable 
income by main income source. The blue 
bars show estimates of the income from 
the Household Economic Survey, which 
is used for most income analyses. The 
dark grey result from work in progress 
by Statistics New Zealand analysing the 
distribution of the national accounts 
(Cope, 2013). They add income that can 
be observed in the economy as a whole 
and must be benefiting some households 
but is not reported in the HES. While 
values should be taken as approximate 
given the status of this work, the largest 
change is for households whose main 
income is from property, which includes 
financial wealth as well as shares, real 
estate and other forms of wealth. Their 
income approximately doubles when this 
‘hidden’ income is recognised, and they 
are by far the highest-income households 
on average, followed by self-employed 
(presumably dominated by high-income 
professionals, farmers and successful 
small business owners), with wage and 
salary earners ahead only of those relying 
mainly on welfare benefits (‘Transfers 
and others’). 
The big loss of income share to labour 
could have been due to the radical shift 
in New Zealand’s industry structure, 
particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, 
which destroyed many relatively high-
paying, high-value-add industries but 
replaced them largely with low-paid 
service industries. However, a shift-share 
analysis which breaks down the changes 
in labour share into those due to shifts 
in industrial structure and those due to 
changes within an industry indicates 
that the big structural changes largely 
cancelled each other out and the fall was 
overwhelmingly due to within-industry 
effects, especially during the 1990s. 
However, one significant structural 
change that would not necessarily show 
up in this analysis is the increased 
international financial integration that 
occurred over the period. The financial 
sector was growing relative to the rest 
of the economy, increasingly reliant on 
overseas funding and itself increasingly 
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Figure 7b: Adjusted labour income share compared to OECD median 
Sources: OECD: AMECO, series ALCD2 New Zealand; SNZ, author's calculations
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Figure 7a: Labour income share compared to OECD median 
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overseas-owned. There was increasing 
financially-driven company takeover 
activity through debt-loaded leveraged 
buyouts, often by overseas-owned private 
equity investors, offshoring by New 
Zealand manufacturers, greatly reduced 
regulation of international capital 
movements, and a freely floating, heavily-
traded dollar. The International Labour 
Organization (2013), while also finding 
that within-industry effects dominate, 
finds global financialisation to be the 
strongest factor in a falling labour share, 
and IMF researchers Jaumotte, Lall and 
Papageorgiou (2013) and Furceri and 
Loungani (2013) find that it contributes 
more generally to income inequality.
Could the low and falling labour 
income share be because of unusually 
high and rising capital intensity? This is 
unlikely, because New Zealand is known 
to have low capital intensity relative to 
Australia and other OECD countries 
(Conway and Meehan, 2013; Mason, 
2013). There was strong growth in capital 
intensity for about six years between the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, when the 
labour share was falling. However, the 
share continued to fall even when this 
growth fell away, and capital intensity 
growth was also reasonably strong in 
the 2000s when the labour share was 
growing. Capital intensity growth was 
low to moderate by OECD standards over 
the whole period (Conway and Meehan, 
2013, p.26). Indeed, in 2005 Hall and 
Scobie concluded: 
We find that the capital intensity in 
New Zealand has not been increasing 
as fast as in Australia for nearly 25 
years. Between 1995 and 2002, lower 
capital intensity explains 70% of 
the difference in output per hour 
worked. Whereas the cost of labour 
relative to capital has been rising 
in Australia, it has fallen by 20% 
in New Zealand between 1987 and 
2002. The relative price of labour 
to capital in New Zealand fell to 
60% of the Australian value in 2002 
after being comparable in the late 
1980s. It is to be expected that New 
Zealand enterprises would therefore 
tend to adopt less capital intensive 
production methods.
The International Labour Organization 
(2013) and Stockhammer (2009) find 
that technology made only a small 
contribution to the fall in the labour 
share in developed countries.
Another possibility is that there was a 
move from wage work to self-employment. 
There has long been concern that 
employees have been forced into much 
less secure employment relationships 
as dependent contractors. As far as the 
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Figure 9: Adjusted and unadjusted labour share "former measured sector" 
excluding arts and recreation
Source: SNZ – National Accounts and Productivity statistics 
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available data allows us to say, there is 
some effect of growth in self-employment 
income, but not enough to substantially 
change the picture of falling labour share. 
Figure 9 shows the comparison for a 
substantial part of the market sector of 
the economy.6 Self-employment peaked 
around 2000 and then returned to levels 
similar to the 1980s, whether looking at 
number of workers or hours paid. As 
with industry restructuring, this hides 
big changes. Data provided by Statistics 
New Zealand shows that there was a fall 
in the proportion of paid hours worked 
by the self-employed in agriculture, 
forestry and fishing, the sector with most 
intensive self-employment, from 60–65% 
in the 1980s and 1990s to around 45% 
this decade. This was counterbalanced 
by a big increase in the large and rapidly 
growing professional, scientific and 
technical services sector, plus smaller 
contributions from elsewhere (for more 
details see Rosenberg, 2014). However, 
it is not clear how much of this increase 
is due to increases in traditionally self-
employed occupations and how much has 
been forced by dependent contracting. 
Finally, there is the possibility that 
the fall in labour share results from a 
significant fall in employees’ bargaining 
power compared to their employers. There 
have been structural and institutional 
changes that make this credible, and it 
is consistent with Piketty’s analysis of 
the international fall in the labour share, 
perhaps summed up in his statement that 
‘in every country the history of inequality 
is political – and chaotic’ (Piketty, 2014, 
p.286). In other words, institutions and 
policies are all-important. The wage 
freeze of 1982–84, for example, coincides 
with a sharp but largely temporary fall in 
the labour share. The OECD in its major 
study on wage inequality, Divided We 
Stand: why inequality keeps rising (2011), 
found that the strongest single driver 
was institutions and policies, particularly 
labour market institutions and policies 
reducing inequality (including union 
coverage, product market regulation, 
employment protection legislation 
and tax wedges). Further, while trade 
integration as such showed no significant 
effect on inequality, imports from low- 
or medium-income developing countries 
had a significant negative effect when the 
importing country had weak employment 
protection legislation (as with New 
Zealand), and particularly when the 
source country was low-income (such 
as China). Similarly, the International 
Labour Organization (2013) finds that 
government consumption and union 
density are major contributors to the fall 
in the labour share.
While this is not the place for a full 
narrative of the policy and institutional 
changes over this period, some examples 
are obvious and are consistent with the 
drivers described by the researchers above. 
The period was one of rapid opening of 
the economy which substantially reduced 
employee bargaining power through 
lower-cost imports, outsourcing and shifts 
of production overseas. Around the same 
time there was radical deregulation of the 
labour market (through the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991), which removed the 
award system and national collective 
bargaining. Together with changes in the 
late 1980s, this contributed to a steep 
decline in union density and collective 
bargaining. Union density fell from 69% 
in the early 1980s to its present level of 
around 20%, most of the fall being by 
the mid-1990s, one of the steepest falls 
in the OECD. The sharp and permanent 
fall in welfare benefits in the 1991 Budget 
relative to the average wage reduced 
reservation wages. The minimum wage 
fell between 1990 and 1999 from 43% 
to 40% of the average wage. Over this 
period the labour share was on a falling 
trend. It bottomed out in 2002 and 
rose until 2009, but to a level below the 
1980s. A new employment law in 2000 
(the Employment Relations Act) mildly 
strengthened collective bargaining, and 
was amended in 2004 to strengthen it 
further; this was followed by a national 
campaign for wage rises by unions (‘5% 
in 05’). However, collective bargaining 
coverage is now not only low, but has the 
lowest extension beyond union members 
of 21 OECD countries surveyed by the 
International Trade Union Confederation 
(2013, pp.28-9). There were strong rises 
in the minimum wage (from 40% to 49% 
of the average wage between 1999 and 
2009, most of which was between 2003 
and 2008). There was a local recession 
in 2008, followed by the global financial 
crisis and the drawn-out international 
recession, combined with further changes 
to employment law and welfare benefits. 
The loss of bargaining power and 
employment protection provides a 
stronger explanation for the loss in 
labour share, is consistent with the 
20.00
22.00
24.00
26.00
28.00
30.00
32.00
34.00
36.00
38.00
40.00
Figure 10: Real compensation of employees per hour compared to labour 
productivity March 2014 dollars (for CPI), measured sector 
Source: SNZ, author's calculations
If it had followed productivity gains Against the GDP deflator
Against Producer prices Against CPI
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
Page 70 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 11, Issue 1 – February 2015
description by Hall and Scobie (2005), 
and is recognised as a significant factor in 
similar trends in other OECD countries 
by the research quoted above, and in 
other studies (e.g. Blanchard, Jaumotte 
and Loungani, 2013; Card, Lemieux 
and Riddell, 2003; DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux, 1995; Fournier and Koske, 
2012; International Monetary Fund and 
International Labour Organization, 2010; 
Kumhof and Rancière, 2010; OECD, 
2012; Western and Rosenfeld, 2011) . 
Wages and productivity
As mentioned, a falling labour share 
can indicate real wages falling behind 
productivity growth. That has indeed 
been the case. Wage increases have fallen 
well behind labour productivity increases 
in the sector of the economy over which 
productivity is measured by Statistics New 
Zealand.7 Between 1989 and 2011 the 
consumer wage, measured by compensation 
of employees per hour paid8 deflated by 
the consumer price index, rose 23%; the 
producer wage – compensation of employees 
per hour deflated by the GDP deflator – rose 
29%, or 24% deflated by the producer price 
index for outputs; while labour productivity 
rose 48% (see Figure 10). Between the 
trough of the recent recession in 2009 and 
2013, labour productivity rose 10.1%, the 
consumer average wage rose 1.5% and the 
producer average wage (using the GDP 
deflator) rose 3.3%. 
Implications
Increased wage inequality, or a fall in 
the wages share in the economy, has 
consequences. Low labour incomes weaken 
aggregate demand and the domestic 
sales of local firms (Onaran and Galanis, 
2012; Stockhammer, 2011; Stockhammer, 
Onaran and Ederer, 2007; Storm and 
Naastepad, 2011). High inequality creates 
pressures on governments to compensate 
people for their loss. Working for Families 
is an example. Effectively a wage subsidy, 
it is falling in real terms as a result of 
frozen thresholds, but even at $2.5bn is 
small compared to the $19bn annual loss 
in labour share. Even then, it has set up 
dynamics that maintain the low-wage 
structure, and consequently in the long 
run increase the pressure to subsidise 
wages.
Low wages also have implications for 
savings. Figure 11 also comes from the 
work by Statistics New Zealand (Cope, 
2013). It shows negative savings on 
average in households whose main source 
of income is from wages and salaries or 
from benefits. Only households whose 
main source of income is from property 
(wealth) saved significantly. Household 
saving as a proportion of disposable 
income across all households shows a very 
similar pattern to the labour share since 
the late 1980s. Saving became negative in 
1995, continued to fall until 2003, then 
recovered as the labour share increased. 
To recap, the International Labour 
Organization research quoted above 
attributes falling labour share in developed 
economies to increased financialisation 
(46%), globalisation (19%) and technology 
(10%), and loss of employee bargaining 
power, de-unionisation and falling 
government spending (25%). Increases 
in unemployment also contribute. Other 
research finds the factors affecting wage 
inequality overlap with these. 
We can conclude that when major 
changes are made to the economy, such 
as those in the 1980s and 1990s, unless 
countervailing measures are maintained 
or put in place, inequality will rise and 
the share of wages in the nation’s income 
will fall, at the expense of the welfare 
of many wage and salary earners. Such 
changes include globalisation – especially 
intensified international financialisation 
– and more intensive use of technology, 
though this has less effect on the labour 
share of income. In other words, the lack 
of such coordination results in winners 
and losers rather than equitable sharing 
of any benefits. The winners will be 
owners of capital, and employees or self-
employed in advantageous bargaining 
positions. Governments during the 
1980s and particularly the 1990s signally 
and often deliberately weakened or 
removed the countervailing measures. 
Effective countervailing measures include 
employment protections, support for 
collective bargaining and unionisation, 
a strong public welfare system and 
progressive taxation. 
1 The share may in fact be somewhat lower because of 
income, mainly from self-employment and investment, 
which appears to be under-reported in the HES. The national 
accounts for the household sector show compensation of 
employees, which is a wider measure of cost to employers 
than wages, as 73.5% of primary income in 2012 (it 
was 75.7% in 1987 and fell to around 70% in the early 
2000s) after deduction of the non-cash items of imputed 
income from home ownership and earnings attributed to 
insurance and pension policy holders, which is approximately 
equivalent to ‘market income’ (depending upon the definition 
of the latter). It was 59.5% of total income after deduction 
of non-cash and non-recurring items that could be identified 
as such. However, the trend, as in the HES, is for the share 
to be increasing, at least since 2000. The household sector 
accounts for 2012 showed entrepreneurial income as 12.9% 
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of this measure of total income, whereas the HES showed 
self-employed income as 4.4%, and the household sector 
accounts showed property income as 8.6% compared to 
4.4% in the HES, and these discrepancies occur throughout 
the years where data is available.
2 Available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-stats/
revenue-refunds/wage-salary-dist-for-ind/. 
3 Before taxes on production less subsidies. 
4 The most common is to assume the self-employed pay 
themselves at the average wage rate for employees in the 
same industry, sometimes capped by mixed income (if the 
data is available, unlike in New Zealand). A second is to 
share mixed income between labour and capital income in 
the same proportion as between compensation of employees 
and remaining gross operating surplus. A third is to assume 
their capital receives the same return as the industry as 
a whole and allocate the remainder to labour, but this is 
often difficult to calculate. For a more thorough discussion 
see Inklaar and Timmer (2013, p.16 ff) or Piketty (2014, 
p.204), both of whom prefer the second method.
5 See UN data, http://data.un.org, Table 4.1, Total Economy 
(S.1); direct link: http://tinyurl.com/og3o3tf. OECD Labour 
Income Share can be found at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=ULC_ANN; Penn World Tables (PWT) 
are at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-
table. The AMECO database is at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/. The problems with 
the various data sets are briefly as follows. The UN data has 
partial coverage by years, and no calculation for adjusted 
labour share. The OECD data, which is adjusted for labour 
share, has been discontinued, and uses inappropriate 
data for New Zealand, underestimating the New Zealand 
adjusted labour share. Replacing that with a consistent 
estimate makes the data set very similar to AMECO, but it 
is not as well documented and does not have the breadth 
of different series. PWT appears to have gaps in its series 
for New Zealand which are interpolated, and it uses five 
different methods for estimating adjusted labour share 
(Inklaar and Timmer, 2013). While this improves validity 
for individual countries, it reduces comparability between 
countries. Like the OECD, AMECO has incorrect data for 
New Zealand for self-employment, which has been replaced 
for the comparison here, and the national accounts series 
have been updated to the latest available at time of writing 
OECD, AMECO and PWT all adjust the labour share for 
New Zealand, and for all countries in the case of OECD and 
AMECO, by multiplying the labour share by total employment 
divided by wage and salary (employee) employment. 
While considerably less than ideal, this has the merit of 
using widely-available data and being consistent between 
countries. It implicitly assumes the self-employed receive the 
same annual labour income as employees. Whole-economy 
New Zealand data for self-employment is available only from 
1986, from the Household Labour Force Survey. Consistent 
with the data set, years ended March are attributed to the 
previous year in AMECO.
6 The adjusted labour share is from a Statistics New Zealand 
estimate for 11 sectors of the economy in its productivity 
series (Infoshare series PRD018AA). Although Statistics New 
Zealand does not use the preferred method described in note 
4, it adjusts using hours worked capped by mixed income, 
which is better than using persons employed. 
7 Measured sector productivity is available only from 1996, 
but is extrapolated back from 1996 to 1989 using the 
published productivity series for a subset of industries, 
the former measured sector, which constituted over 80% 
of it during this period. The year 1989 is chosen as 
approximately when the divergence of wages and productivity 
appears to have begun and also is the first year of the 
Quarterly Employment Survey average wage series. The 
GDP deflator was calculated at basic prices (i.e. excluding 
producer taxes less subsidies) for the measured sector to 
2011 and extrapolated to 2012 using the GDP expenditure 
deflator, which it closely matches.
8 The wage measure is calculated by dividing compensation 
of employees for the measured sector by the number of 
paid hours worked by employees in the sector (provided by 
Statistics New Zealand). The GDP deflator is calculated for 
the measured sector at basic prices (i.e. excluding producer 
taxes less subsidies).
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